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Abstract 
India is converging its practices to be consistent with IFRS, but in the case of goodwill impairment 
how much consistency is there among Indian companies and auditors, and how much impairment has 
been disclosed.  The paper investigates these questions. Arguably, the issue of how India writes-down 
goodwill is important as Indian companies and the Indian share market are influential throughout the 
world. It is a question of recognition, measurement and disclosure.   
The findings are that different methods of writing down goodwill are recognised implying different 
methods of measurement. There is even more inconsistency around disclosure as nearly half of the top 
50 companies analysed on the Bombay exchange failed to mention any write down of goodwill.  Some 
companies claimed that they were testing for impairment but no case of actual impairment was 
reported. This, in spite of some compaines reporting declining earnings and share price. 
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1. Introduction
In late 2013, The Economist journal published an 
article entitled “Goodwill Hunting” which reported a 
conspicuous lack of impairment among public Indian 
companies and identified as a possible explanation 
“arm twisting” of auditors by powerful company 
executives. To find out what is the case, this paper 
sets out to examine the write-down practices of the 
top 50 public companies listed on the Bombay 
exchange.   
International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS) is fast becoming the global accounting 
language. Over 100 countries have now adopted IFRS 
and many more have committed to make the 
transition in the next few years. The benefits of global 
standards are widely acknowledged. For companies, 
however, the conversion to IFRS is a major change 
both for the finance function and for the wider 
business. India is one of the largest jurisdictions that 
are currently going through the process of 
convergence with IFRS. Considering the diversity and 
complexity amongst Indian Companies that will 
undertake IFRS reporting, the Ministry of Corporate 
Affairs (MCA) has announced a roadmap which 
requires Indian Companies to adopt the converged 
standards in a phased manner from 1 April, 2011 
onwards.  
The purpose of this study is to investigate 
goodwill treatment among the 50 top listed Indian 
Companies, on the Bombay exchange during the three 
year period 2010-12, with regard to either 
impairment, amortization or if there is a total 
disregard for providing information about goodwill. 
Also, the study considers the role of auditors and their 
treatment or not of impairment in the accounts 
especially in the light of declining share values and 
price-earnings ratio.  
In terms of the International Financial Reporting 
Standards, goodwill acquired in a business 
combination is an asset and must initially be 
measured at cost (IFRS 3 par.51). After initial 
recognition, the acquirer must  measure  this 
goodwill  at  cost,  less  any  accumulated  impairment 
losses  (IFRS 3 par.54). The acquirer must test 
goodwill for impairment annually, or more frequently, 
if events or changes in circumstances indicate that it 
might be impaired, in accordance with IAS 36, 
Impairment of Assets (IFRS 3 par. 55). Because The 
Economist in 2013 reports, in respect of Tata Steel, on 
how “executives twist the arms” of auditors 
pressurising then to delay impairments. Thus, the aim 
of this study is to review and analysis the accounting 
treatment of goodwill in Indian companies. 
It may be argued that the new treatment of 
goodwill has created potential auditing challenges for 
auditors. Auditors  will  not  only  have  to  deal  with 
the  unexpected  complexities and ambiguities but 
also regarding the assignment of fair value. To 
examine causes and consequences, and in the case 
typical case of Tata Steel, the Economist finds that 
excess payment in acquisition should be related to 
higher subsequent impairment loss. But testing for 
impairment by auditors is one thing and actual 
impairment is another.   
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The literature (Bloom, 2009; Brunovs & Kirsch, 
1991; Boyle & Carpenter, 2011; Ding et al., 2008; 
Jennings, LeClere & Thompson, 2001; Moehrle, 
Reynolds & Wallace, 2001) on goodwill behaviour 
claims that the managerial acquiescence is the most 
important determinant of write-down decisions. The 
calculation of impairment is therefore subject to 
manipulation and may be unreliable due to 
management’s estimation. This study conducted on 
the top 50 listed companies in India may provide 
evidence of the extent of convergence with IFRS 
practice. Another question to investigate is how the 
Big 4, Second tier and Indian auditors are treating 
goodwill in terms of reporting and how much they 
have moved to IFRS impairment testing.  
The study covers the top 50 companies only 
listed in Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE). The 
enterprises are chosen on the basis of market 
capitalization. We have collected data from the annual 
reports of the companies, available on their websites. 
The aim is to investigate if there is a consensus on the 
method treatment of goodwill among Indian auditors.  
The paper is organized as follows. The next 
section discusses goodwill, the standards requiring 
impairment and the problems associated with 
impairment.  Further discussion considers the 
arguments for and against amortization, the 
advantages and disadvantages of impairment, 
implications of impairment and the problems that 
arise for auditors. With regard to the empirical 
section, the method employed is explained followed 
by the presentation of the findings from the analysis. 
A final discussion concludes the paper. 
2. Discussion and Review
Goodwill 
In 2001, the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(“FASB”) expressed its opinion that it is virtually 
impossible to predict accurately the useful life of 
goodwill and amortisation of goodwill is not a faithful 
representation of the true pattern of declining 
goodwill (FASB 2001b).  Subsequently, FASB 
published the Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards (“SFAS”) 142, “Goodwill and other 
intangible assets”, which prohibits amortisation of 
goodwill. 
SFAS 42 requires instead annual impairment 
tests to reflect the true and fair view of the assets 
values.The purpose of this accounting rule is to 
encourage management to communicate privately 
held information about goodwill and provide 
stakeholders with better quality information to assess 
the performance and future cash flows of the company 
(Li et al., 2011; Ding et al, 2008; AbuGhazalehet al., 
2012). In order to seek international convergence and 
global harmonisation, the International Accounting 
Standards Board (“IASB”) followed the FASB’s 
approach in 2004 by replacing IAS 22 with IFRS 3, 
and converging with US GAAP. IFRS 3 declares that 
from the beginning of the first annual period 
beginning on or after 31 March 2004, all entities must 
discontinue amortising goodwill and must test the 
goodwill for impairment. 
In the same year, IASB issued IAS 36 
Impairment of Assets, which provided a two-step 
approach for goodwill impairment testing as follows: 
- Step 1: Compare the carrying amount of the 
unit, including the goodwill, with its recoverable 
amount. The recoverable amount of such a unit should 
be measured, consistent with the requirements in IAS 
36, as the higher of value in use and net selling price. 
If the recoverable amount of the unit exceeds its 
carrying amount, goodwill is not impaired. If not, then 
follow Step 2. 
- Step 2: Compare the implied value of goodwill 
with its carrying amount. Implied goodwill 
is the excess of the recoverable amount of the 
unit to which the goodwill has been allocated over the 
fair value of the net identifiable assets that the entity 
would recognise if it acquired that unit in a business 
combination on the date of the impairment test. Any 
excess of the carrying amount of goodwill over its 
implied value is recognised immediately, in profit or 
loss, as an impairment loss. Any remaining excess of 
the carrying amount of the unit over its recoverable 
amount is recognised as an impairment loss and 
allocated to the other assets of the unit on a pro rata 
basis, based on the carrying amount of each asset in 
the unit. 
Prior theoretical and empirical research suggests 
that acquirers often overpay for the target. These 
studies argue that overpayment may result from 
agency conflicts in mergers and tender  offers (The 
Economist, 2013). Managers may  act  in  their  own 
self-interest at  the expense of shareholders in  order 
to  remain  entrenched or to  decrease  the  risk 
associated with their managerial human capital. It has 
found that higher payments of excess (acquisition 
price as a percentage of target’s book value) and 
premium (acquisition price as a percentage of target’s 
price) are related to higher subsequent impairment 
loss. Acquirers often overpay, when the purchase 
consideration includes a high stock component, which 
has a significant positive relation between the 
interaction variable and impairment loss (Bloom, 
2009; Brunovs & Kirsch, 1991). 
Goodwill impairment loss is estimated in most 
cases from management’s projections of future cash 
flows. Thus, it is plausible that the impairment loss 
conveys some private information of managers to 
investors. Also, the subjectivity inherent in estimating 
the  impairment  loss  using unverifiable fair  values 
could reduce  the information content of the 
impairment loss (Skinner, 2008). Thus, it may be 
debatable whether the announcement of a goodwill 
impairment loss reveals new information to market 
participants. 
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There are a number of questions that may be 
raised around the concept of impairment. First, 
whether the announcement of a goodwill impairment 
loss provides new information to market participants. 
Second, whether the impairment loss is related to 
subsequent performance and thereby shed light on the 
nature of the information conveyed by the 
impairment. Third, whether the magnitude of 
goodwill impairment can be predicted by proxies of 
overpayment for the target at the time of the 
acquisition (Boyle & Carpenter, 2011; Petersen & 
Plenberg, 2010). 
The difference in the measurement of goodwill 
impairment and the timing of loss recognition under 
SFAS 121 and SFAS 142 has implications for testing 
impairment. The specific focus of SFAS 142 is on 
goodwill as anasset, the guidelines for its fair value 
measurement, and the periodic impairment testing 
requirement suggest that recognition of goodwill 
impairment under SFAS 142 may  (arguably) be 
more precise and timely relative to that under SFAS 
121 and therefore may have a stronger market 
reaction.  
The literature shows that on average the market 
revises its expectations downward on the 
announcement of a goodwill impairment loss and the 
downward revision is related to the magnitude of the 
impairment loss.. Overall, the evidence suggests that 
the announcement of goodwill impairment reveals 
negative information about the firm to the market (Li 
et al, 2011; Laghi et al, 2013; AbuGhazaleh et al, 
2012). 
There is discussion on the nature of the 
information conveyed by the impairment loss. First, if 
the impairment loss conveys managers’ private 
information about the firm’s adverse future earnings 
prospects, they expect financial analysts to revise 
their earnings forecasts downward subsequent to the 
loss announcement. The impairment loss thus appears 
to be a leading indicator of a decline in future 
profitability, likely because the company failed to 
realize the expected benefits of prior acquisitions. 
Further, they find that the announcement market 
reaction can be largely attributed to investors revising 
their expectations of future sales and operating profits 
downward based on the information conveyed by the 
impairment (Petersen & Plenberg, 2010). 
Market participants respond to the unexpected 
impairment loss negatively. Moreover, an expected 
impairment of goodwill in fact significantly predicts a 
decline in future performance. Taken together, these 
results lead us to conjecture that the market perceives 
that some firms with potentially impaired goodwill 
have used their managerial discretion to avoid taking 
the impairment loss in the post acquisition period. 
This interpretation is consistent with the implications 
of Ramanna and Watts (2010) that firms that avoided 
taking an impairment loss may have acted 
opportunistically. 
The suggestion is that overpayment for acquired 
targets could be a potential contributing factor to the 
subsequent goodwill impairment. Thus, it appears that 
the value of goodwill of these firms may have been 
partly impaired at the outset due to overpayment for 
targets and may have been further depleted by 
subsequent negative events. Generally, investors and 
financial analysts revise their expectations downward 
on the announcement of an impairment loss. Further 
analysis shows that the impairment loss is negatively 
correlated with the average growth in sales and 
operating profits of subsequent years. Moreover, the 
market reaction can be attributed mainly to news 
about the decline in subsequent sales and operating 
profits that is conveyed by the impairment loss (Li et 
al, 2011; Laghi et al, 2013; AbuGhazaleh et al, 2012). 
Wang (2011) found that the change from 
amortisation to impairment promotes and improves 
the investors' understanding of the components of 
companies’ earnings and also clears up their 
confusions on goodwill amortisation information. 
Subsequently, the accounting treatment on goodwill 
in most listed companies in Anglo-Saxon countries 
are no longer amortised, instead there is testing for 
impairment annually or whenever there is an 
indication that the goodwill may be impaired, in 
accordance with IFRS 3. Public companies have to 
recognise an impairment loss when the carrying 
amount exceeds the recoverable amount. Goodwill 
impairment loss may show some correlations with 
operations, performance and investors’ confidence (Li 
et al., 2011). First, goodwill impairment was found to 
be a leading indicator of a decline in prospective sales 
and operating profits, and of a failure to realise the 
expected benefits from prior acquisitions. Second, 
overpayment for the prior acquisition could be 
another potential contributing factor as companies 
recognise the overpayment in terms of goodwill 
impairment by subsequent negative events. Third, the 
announcement of a goodwill impairment loss would 
influence investors’ confidence and cause financial 
analysts to revise their expectations of prospective 
cash flows downwards. 
Although the impairment test is costly, time 
consuming and susceptible to manipulation, it is 
arguably a better approach for reflecting future 
prospects of investments and gives a true and fair 
view of the business. It is worth noting that the IASB 
has recently decided to conduct a post implementation 
review (the “PIR”) on IFRS 3 which introduces some 
possible solutions to address the existing issues 
encountered. This includes improving the existing 
impairment test rules and disclosure requirements by 
IAS 36 and reintroducing goodwill amortisation in 
addition to the impairment test (Laghi et al., 2013). 
Intangible assets are the most difficult to value in 
acquisition accounting, and one of the most complex 
and controversial of the intangible assets is goodwill. 
At its most basic goodwill is an acquisition premium. 
Goodwill is the cost above the fair value of a firm 
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once all the assets of the firm have been stated at fair 
value (Skinner, 2008). 
Amortisation 
The literature (Nobes & Parker, 2012) reveals the 
goodwill reflects the ability of a company to earn an 
excess return on investment. Systematic amortisation 
with additional impairment testing assumes that the 
factors that constitute acquired goodwill generally 
diminish in value over time, and that the related costs 
are systematically charged to income over the useful 
life of the goodwill.  
Some debate (Bloom, 2009; Brunovs & Kirsch, 
1991; Boyle & Carpenter, 2011; Ding et al., 2008; 
Jennings, LeClere & Thompson, 2001; Moehrle, 
Reynolds & Wallace, 2001) regarding the most 
appropriate method of accounting for goodwill that 
arises from an acquisition raged during the early 
1990s and again during the early 2000s. The debate in 
the early 1990’s resulted in the general amortisation 
of goodwill. Conceptually, amortisation is a method 
to allocate the cost of goodwill over the period it is 
consumed. This is consistent with the approach taken 
with regard to other fixed assets that do not have 
indefinite useful lives (IASB 2004d).  Overpayment 
for the assets of an acquired company generally 
reflects an expectation of high future earnings. 
Amortisation of this  overpayment  ensures  that  the 
overpayment  is  matched  with  the  expected  future 
earnings (Boyle & Carpenter 2011; Fontanot 2003). 
Although the useful life of goodwill cannot be 
predicted, an amortization period of between 20 to 40 
years was often applied, with a satisfactory level of 
reliability; systematic amortisation provides an 
appropriate balance between conceptual soundness 
and operationality at an acceptable cost. 
Impairment versus amortisation: 
advantages of impairment 
One of the main arguments of the FASB in proposing 
the impairment approach was that it would lead to 
improved financial reporting, because the financial 
statements of entities that acquire goodwill would 
reflect the underlying economics of those assets 
better. As a result, financial statement users would be 
better able to understand the investments made in 
those assets and the subsequent performance of those 
investments (FASB 2001b).  
According to Moehrle (2001), a good 
impairment test promotes transparency, because the 
trigger  is  a change  in underlying  economic  or 
business  conditions,  not an arbitrary period. As a 
result, reporting is based on current events that affect 
the business. If it is properly managed, goodwill is an 
appreciating asset, and if it is not properly managed, 
the impairment test will recognise any reduction in 
value (Petersen & Plenberg, 2010).  
Another argument against amortisation of 
goodwill is based on the assumption that goodwill is a 
wasting asset (that is, finite), and thus ignores the fact 
that some kinds of goodwill can have an indefinite 
useful life. The value of a business, and consequently 
of its goodwill, does not necessarily wear out. It can 
be maintained or even improved by careful 
management and by cash expenditure charged against 
the income stream. 
The  underlying  logic for  removing  the 
traditional  amortisation  method  is  that amortisation 
on  a  straight-line  basis  over  a  set  number  of 
years  contains  no information value for those using 
financial reports (Ravlic, 2003). In a review of capital 
markets research, Clinch (1995) concludes that there 
is no clear evidence of any association between 
goodwill amortisation and share values. That is, there 
is little, if any, firm evidence that goodwill 
amortisation expense included in the calculation of 
periodic profit reflects information that is used by 
investors in setting share prices and returns. A 
problem of the amortisation method relates to time 
period estimation. An estimate of the useful life of 
goodwill becomes less reliable as the length of the 
useful life increases (Waxman, 2001). By being based 
on an actual valuation of goodwill, the IFRS-based 
standard’s impairment testing policy moves away 
from an arbitrary assessment of useful life. The 
overall advantage, from a balance sheet perspective, is 
that the valuation of goodwill will be more closely 
aligned to a real assessment of asset value, rather than 
reflecting an arbitrary “cost less accumulated 
amortisation” calculation. Also, from an income 
statement perspective, any recognition of a loss as a 
result of a write-down in the valuation of goodwill 
will be more closely aligned to a real economic 
decline in value rather than an arbitrary amortisation 
calculation. The new treatment should therefore be 
more aligned with the decision- making needs of 
financial report users (Ding et al, 2008). 
Disadvantages of impairment 
With regard to the capitalisation of internally 
generated goodwill, one of the main arguments of the 
respondents  to ED 3 in support  of  amortisation  was 
that  it  prohibits  the  recognition  of  internally 
generated goodwill, which is consistent with the 
general prohibition in IAS 38 on the recognition of 
internally generated goodwill (IASB 2004d).    The 
impairment test does not distinguish between acquired 
goodwill and this pre-existing goodwill of the 
company that is being acquired, nor between acquired 
goodwill and the goodwill internally generated after 
the combination 
Goodwill impairment is not without its 
problems. First, the impairment test may impose 
significant cost on companies (Wiese, 2005). The 
valuation of goodwill is complex and unlikely to be 
verifiable, thus specialised experts and specific 
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valuation techniques are often required for 
impairment test. According to a survey conducted by 
the American Business Conference, Grant Thornton, 
LLP, and the NASDAQ Stock Market, Inc. (Lewis et 
al., 2001), 71% of selected CFOs in the survey would 
use “outside assistance” to perform the impairment 
test. Second, the impairment test may be liable to 
manipulation. The impairment criteria provided by the 
standard are drafted in such a way as to leave 
significant room for managerial discretion, 
interpretation, judgement and bias (Massoud & 
Raiborn, 2003). Companies may act opportunistically 
by using their greater managerial reporting discretion 
to avoid reporting an impairment loss (Li et al., 2011). 
Management may act for their self-interest at the 
expense of shareholders as considerations of vanity 
arise after an overpayment for an acquisition becomes 
apparent. Third, the uncertainty and subjective 
judgements involved in impairment tests may affect 
the reliability of the information provided by the 
disclosures demanded by users of financial statements 
to assess future cash flow generated from goodwill 
(Wang, 2011). Such subjectivity may make it no less 
arbitrary than amortisation (Wiese, 2005). 
There are possibilities for companies to enhance 
their earnings per share at a satisfactory level without 
taking any impairment on goodwill. This could 
deceive investors into considering that such 
companies are doing better than anticipated, thus 
increasing and overvaluing their stock prices (Basi & 
Penning, 2002). The accounting treatment of goodwill 
has been a long standing issue of concern to 
accountants and accounting standards committees for 
more than a decade. Both amortisation and 
impairment tests involve a certain degree of 
subjectivity, and have different drawbacks either in 
implementation difficulties or theoretical support 
(Boyle & Carpenter, 2011; Petersen & Plenberg, 
2010). There is no perfect solution to satisfy everyone 
on the options of how to recognise the decline in the 
value of goodwill. 
Impairment can have an arbitrary effect on 
earnings as annual  systematic  charges  to goodwill 
are  more  objective  than  periodic  reviews  for 
impairment.  The latter would allow firms greater 
opportunities to manage their earnings (Schoderbek & 
Slaubaugh 2001). There is also the issue of 
complexity: IFRS 3 puts its faith in a potentially 
unreliable and very complex impairment test.    The 
projection  of  future  cash  flows  is  difficult, 
especially  in  developing  and volatile   industries 
(such  as  the  “high  tech”  and  telecommunications 
industries).  
Cost is another factor. The cost of the 
impairment tests is likely to be high and the benefits 
may be diminished by their potential unreliability. For 
smaller companies, both quoted and unquoted, the 
costs may outweigh any possible benefit. To ensure 
compliance with SFAS 142 and to avoid unexpected 
charges, many companies in the USA are paying more 
for professional valuation services to value goodwill 
and other intangibles (Boyle & Carpenter, 2011). 
Perhaps the most salient issue is that of 
subjectivity. The impairment test is subject to a high 
degree of subjectivity and uncertainty, which may 
make it no less arbitrary than amortisation. The 
determination of the fair value of a unit and the 
detailed measurement of the implied fair value of 
goodwill may be so subjective that the timing and 
amount of write-downs may not always be 
independently verifiable (Skinner, 2008; Waxman 
2001). 
Another argument against impairment is that 
there are different accounting treatments for other 
assets. IFRS 3 does not differentiate goodwill in the 
same manner as IAS 38 differentiates other intangible 
assets. Goodwill and other intangible assets that are 
similar in nature will thus be subject to different 
accounting treatments, which will diminish 
comparability and reliability.  
The new IFRS treatment introduces considerable 
scope for uncertainty and therefore creative 
accounting (Holt, 2013). The first potential difficulty 
relates to identifying cash-generating units.  The 
identification of a cash-generating unit could be 
difficult in cases where a company has acquired 
another entity and the latter consists of a number of 
separate subsidiaries, divisions and/or branches. 
Should the cash-generating unit be identified as the 
complete initial entity purchased or should a number 
of sub-units be identified? Further, potential 
difficulties arise with the overlap between the 
identification of cash-generating units and the 
assessment of the recoverable amount of the unit. 
Determining recoverable amount involves calculating 
fair value less costs to sell and value in use of the unit. 
However, the identification of the initial cash-
generating unit/units could have a strong bearing on 
those calculations. As recoverable amount is 
calculated as the higher of a cash-generating unit’s 
fair value less cost to sell and value in use, the many 
assumptions adopted in the various calculations 
required become critical. Just as   management   could 
bias   the estimated   recoverable amount   of a cash-
generating unit in an upward direction to avoid 
impairment loss recognition, valuations in the 
transition period to the new IFRS treatment could be 
biased in a downward direction. In this way, the 
company could deliberately recognise possibly 
excessive impairment losses in the transition period. 
An associated concern relates to cost and time issues. 
Conducting a detailed impairment test on every 
applicable asset and associated goodwill at the end of 
each reporting period will, in many cases, be time 
consuming and costly (McGreachin, 1997; Rockness 
et al., 2001). For this reason, company management 
will have incentives to recognise cash-generating 
units at as high a level of aggregation as possible. 
In summary, there is scope for creative 
accounting. It may well be that goodwill  will  remain 
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on  balance  sheets  and  that  reported  profits  will 
not  be significantly affected by impairment losses 
over time. Management will certainly have financial 
reporting incentives to avoid recording impairment 
losses if possible. 
Imlications of impairment 
First, the rules provide too much flexibility in the 
measurement of goodwill and give firms too much 
discretion in timing the write-off. This can lead to 
pressure on auditors as The Economist (2013) found. 
Second, there is an effect on earnings. Basi  and 
Penning  (2002)  note  that  the  one-time  charge-offs 
that may be made  after a change to impairment could 
further depress already weak earnings in the financial 
records of some companies. They estimate that in the 
USA in 2001 nearly two -thirds of major companies 
would have to record some impairment of goodwill 
on adoption of SFAS 142 (Investor Relations 
Business 2001).  Third, there is the effect of the 
change from amortisation to impairment. 
Amortisation results in a very small effect on the 
profitability of the acquiring company, especially 
where it is written off over a long period (Basi & 
Penning 2002). This was confirmed by the significant 
effect of the changeover to an impairment test in 2002 
on  companies  in  the USA  where  goodwill  had 
been  amortised  over long periods before (Basi  and 
Penning, 2002). 
Impairment may be avoided because of the 
subjectivity it involves for financial report preparers 
and auditors, and for its potentially serious impact on 
financial results. For example, the introduction of the 
requirement for more explicit estimates of fair values 
subsequent to initial acquisition may introduce 
increased uncertainty and a lessening of transparency, 
as the new reporting regime will rely on increased 
professional judgment by preparers and auditors 
(Skinner, 2008). Specifically, company management, 
in collaboration with the accounting profession, will 
need to use their valuation and measurement expertise 
and skills to estimate fair values rather than refer to 
verifiable transaction amounts.  By replacing the 
amortisation  of goodwill with  impairment testing 
and relying  on fair  value  estimates,  further 
opportunity  for creative  earnings management at the 
individual company level may have been established 
(Gowthorpe and Amat, 2005). 
Fair value is defined in International Financial 
Reporting Standards as “the amount for which an 
asset could be exchanged, or a liability settled, 
between knowledgeable, willing parties in an  arm’s 
length  transaction”  (see, for example, AASB 3, 
Appendix). Unfortunately, determination of the fair 
value of an asset in individual situations is not always 
straightforward. When capital markets are not perfect 
or are incomplete and the fair value concept is 
ambiguous with respect to measurement and 
valuation, it is possible in individual situations that 
several fair values could exist (Barth and Landsman, 
1995; Bradbury, 2000). In incomplete market settings, 
the alternative fair value constructs of entry value 
(replacement cost), exit value (market/liquidation 
value) and value-in-use (earnings 
capitalisation/present value of future cash flows) are 
likely to differ (Beaver, 1981; Barth and Landsman, 
1995). Consequently, measurement error in fair value 
estimates can exist, affecting their relevance and 
reliability. The application of fair value concepts to 
the determination of goodwill can result in wide 
variations in valuation depending on the assumptions 
inherent in the various calculations required. 
Auditing 
Potential problems for auditors will commence with 
the initial entries recording a business combination. 
The assignment of fair values to the identifiable net 
assets acquired determines the amount of goodwill or 
discount on acquisition, given that goodwill/discount 
on acquisition is the difference between the fair value 
of the identifiable net assets acquired and the cost of 
the business combination (Skinner, 2008). A second 
potential problem relates to the revised treatment for 
discount on acquisition. Discount on acquisition 
(negative goodwill) arises when the cost of 
acquisition is less than the fair value of the net 
identifiable assets acquired, effectively representing a 
“bargain purchase” (Boyle & Carpenter, 2011).  
Auditors  will  not  only  have  to  deal  with  the 
unexpected  complexities and ambiguities but also 
regarding the assignment of fair value. Auditors will 
also have to verify the identification of cash-
generating units, calculations of the estimated selling 
price of the unit, and calculations of the value in use 
of the cash-generating unit based on estimates of 
discounted cash flows.  Hence, all the complexities 
involved in confirming the level at which cash-
generating units should be recognised, in estimating a 
“hypothetical” market transaction and in estimating 
net cash inflows, residual values and discount rates 
will result in great scope for disagreement and tension 
between auditors and financial report preparers. A 
company  may  engage  a  professional  valuation 
services  firm  to  value  its cash-generating units and 
goodwill, and this practice is occurring with greater 
frequency (Wiese, 2005).  
In such consulting engagements, the valuation 
firm is not restricted by applicable accounting 
standards, and is not required to specifically consider 
the needs of individual financial report users and 
qualitative characteristics such as relevance and 
reliability. The company may choose a compliant 
valuer to supply a valuation consistent with 
management’s wishes. This then potentially places the 
auditor in a difficult position when faced with such an 
“expert” valuation. Because of the many required 
assumptions implicit in valuation that are often not 
capable of audit by reference to objective evidence, it 
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is the auditor who is put on the “back foot” and in a 
defensive position to disprove any valuation procured 
by the company’s management (Holt, 2013).  
Auditors are not unanimous in their views about 
the appropriateness of goodwill accounting rules in 
IFRS. This may result from a lack of experience on 
the long-term effects of the current practice. Auditors 
have a difficult role in balancing between the interests 
of those who pay their fees and those who require 
accurate information about fair values (Ronen, 2008).   
In 2001, the USA introduced a similar 
impairment testing system. The American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA, 2003) suggests 
that the audit of business combinations and associated 
goodwill and other intangible assets is complex, 
costly and time-consuming, as many of the audit 
objectives require considerable substantive testing to 
substantiate the valuation of goodwill. Moreover, if a 
company’s reported earnings are to be reduced 
significantly, perhaps even resulting in a reported loss 
as a result of goodwill write downs, the new 
accounting treatment is vulnerable to manipulation 
and creative accounting, particularly by management 
who might desire a more favourable outcome for 
compensation and/or market considerations as 
suggested by agency theory (Gowthorpe and Amat, 
2005). In summary, the major auditing challenges 
arise from the following: 
(1) Company directors may bias initial valuations of 
assets, liabilities and contingent liabilities in business 
combination to: maximise the valuation of goodwill, 
which is now not subject to periodic amortisation; and 
to maximise the excess of the fair value of net assets 
acquired over purchase consideration to enable the 
immediate recognition of this excess (discount on 
acquisition) as a gain in profit and loss. 
(2) There  is  the  potential  for  disagreement 
between  company  directors  and auditors on the 
identification of cash-generating units and in the 
valuations of those units by reference to recoverable 
amount (higher of fair value less cost to sell and value 
in use, both of which may require a large number of 
arbitrary assumptions to be made in calculation). 
(3) The  auditor  does not  have  reference,  in  many 
cases, to  wholly objective evidence pertaining  to the 
valuation assumptions  adopted by management, 
especially in situations where the relevant cash-
generating unit and the assets it comprises are not 
subject to active capital markets (and especially where 
the unit comprises unique facilities). 
(4) A compliant valuer could well provide a valuation 
for a cash-generating unit, and related goodwill, that 
suggests that no impairment loss needs to be 
recognised. 
This puts the auditor in an unenviable position of 
having to disprove company valuations, especially in 
situations where there is a lack of objective evidence 
to support any valuation (Rees & Jones, 2012). 
Method 
The present study covers the only listed companies in 
Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE). It includes both 
government and private sector companies. The 
enterprises are chosen on the basis of market 
capitalization. The top fifty corporate enterprises are 
considered for the sample. Two criteria are used for 
the selection of the companies in the final sample. 
First, the enterprises are listed only in BSE. Second, 
their accounting and market data, both were available 
for the study 
The period covered is three years, ranging from 
2010 - 12 as it was considered a reasonably good 
period to analyse goodwill treatments due to number 
of acquisition by Indian companies. We have picked 
data of goodwill, minority interest, profit, auditors, 
earning per share and notes on account of goodwill 
from annual reports of the companies. 
Findings 
In the analysis, we have find out that 10 companies of 
the top 50 companies (see table 1) are following 
goodwill amortization approach as disclosed in their 
notes on the accounts in their consolidated financial 
statement.  However, these 10 companies are not 
following any standard approach for number of years 
of amortization, this is because the amortization 
period allowed may vary between 5 to 15 years.  Out 
of these 10 companies, two are audited by the Big 4 
and the remainder by others.  
By contrast, 14 companies show in their notes to 
accounts that their goodwill is tested for impairment. 
However the financial statements reveal that there is 
no impairment done by them during this period. 
Surprisingly 8 of the 14 companies are audited by 
“Big 4” auditors and although they mention in the 
financial statements that they are testing goodwill for 
impairment, there is no evidence of actual 
impairment. More serious is the finding that 24 
companies do not disclose any note on goodwill so no 
public information on how goodwill is treated is 
available. 
Table 1. Analysis of the companies 
Treatment of Goodwill Big 4 Tier II Indian Total 
Goodwill amortized 2 1 7 10 
Goodwill Tested for Impairment 8 6 14 
No Note on Goodwill 4 1 19 24 
Not amortized but no note on impairment 1 1 2 
Total 15 2 33 50 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 11, Issue 4, 2014, Continued - 1 
191 
Of the almost 50% (24) of companies that do not 
disclose any notes regarding goodwill treatment in 
accounts, and most of these (19) are audited by Indian 
firms. Rather ambiguously, two companies (audited 
by Tier II auditors) have mentioned that they are not 
amortizing but have not mentioned whether they are 
impairing or not. Overall fifteen companies are 
audited by big 4 auditors, two by tier II and the 
remaining (33) by Indian auditors. 
Table 2. Analysis of the companies 
Relationship - EPS+MPS Big 4 Tier II Indian Total 
EPS Increased but MPS decreased 1 3 4 
EPS decreased but MPS increased 3 3 6 
Both EPS and MPS Increased 4 1 11 16 
Both EPS and MPS decreased 3 9 12 
Both EPS and MPS fluctuate 4 1 7 12 
Total 15 2 33 50 
To check whether earnings per share and market 
price per share influenced the impairment of goodwill 
as market worth of company due to decreases in EPS 
and MPS, the relation between earnings per share, 
market price of share and price earnings ratio. The 
analysis shows that EPS and MPS have gone up for 
16 companies but on the other hand 12 companies 
have shown both earnings and price going down (see 
table 2). For these latter 12 companies some 
impairment may be warranted. However, nine 
companies (out of 28) have mentioned in their notes 
to the accounts that they are testing goodwill for 
impairment but still there is no sign of impairment of 
goodwill in their accounts. 
Conclusion 
Goodwill is a complex and controversial intangible 
asset. Accounting  for  goodwill  is one  of  the  more 
subjective  aspects  of  financial  reporting. It is 
therefore also very difficult to find an accurate 
method for measuring goodwill in terms of whether it 
has been consumed or not (Rees & Jones, 2012). In 
2001, Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) 
prohibited systematic amortization of goodwill. But, it 
seems in India amortisation is still practised by public 
companies. The findings of this analysis reveal a 
situation where Indian public companies seem to 
follow their own or their auditors preferences.  Why is 
their in India and possibly in many other countries to 
what are Western standards requiring impairment? 
There are many possibilities to explain such 
resistance.  First, it seems auditors and particularly 
Indian audit firms may be reluctant to change their 
practices because of the costs involved and Indian 
management may prefer the opportunites for earnings 
management that non-disclosure of practice offers.  
Second, the lack of effective oversight by the Bombay 
exchange allows a variety of practices to continue. 
After all, why change if there is no compulsion? 
Third, those companies that disclose they are testing 
for impairment would seem to meet international 
standards but without any actual impairment 
following such tests, the true situation remians 
ambiguous. 
The study conducted on the top 50 listed 
companies in India provides some evidence that 
impairment is being avoided as the data reveals no 
actual case of an impairment among the 50 companies 
during the period. Yet some of the companies have in 
the period expereienced a decline in earnings and 
share price. With many of the 50 companies not 
disclosing any information around goodwill there is a 
lack of transparency inherent that could, at worst 
imply some earnings management, at best, a 
reluctance to disclose what they are doing or not 
doing.  The lack of information revealed in this study 
indicates that auditors have a difficult role in 
balancing the interests of those who pay their fees and 
those who require accurate information about fair 
values.  As the Economist (2013) suggest “arms are 
being twisted” by powerful executives. Whether all 
Indian public companies will follow international 
practices and recognise measure and disclose 
impairment unambiguously remains – “to be or not to 
be”. 
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